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1   Introduction – how can design research contribute to AI? 
Artificial intelligence is a vast field of research whose output is shaping information and 
communication technologies that affect our economical and social life on a daily basis. On the rather 
rich list of topics relevant to research in artificial intelligence, it is surprising to note that creativity, a 
hallmark of human intelligence, is rather at the bottom of the list and not a priority in the mainstream 
research in AI. For a field whose ambition is to produce human level performance on tasks that require 
intelligence this absence is curious, to say the least. A major reason for this apparent lack of interest in 
studying creativity formally and implementing systems that aspire to be creative is the absence of 
clear, rigorous definitions of what creativity is. This is in contrast, for instance, to decision and 
learning, two processes for which more than half a century of efforts have led to precise formal 
frameworks enabling systematic and fruitful studies of these notions and building high-performance 
systems. 
 
By contrast artificial intelligence, creativity has been studied intensively in design research, especially 
with empirical approaches. Starting with early work by Eastman (Eastman 1969, 1970), Akin (Akin 
1978) and still others, a major approach that has been used in the study of designers thinking processes 
has been the protocol-based analysis. A large quantity of contributions has been produced (see e.g. 
(Cross 2001) for a review). One overall striking feature of a majority of this research is the quasi-total 
reliance on the problem-solving paradigm in the their interpretation of their results. There is now a 
growing consensus (see e.g. (Dorst 2006) or (Hatchuel 2002)) claiming that problem-solving (even in 
a broad sense of the notion) is too restrictive as a ‘lens’ to interpret design – which is a cause for 
concern in the interpretation of those results. Moreover, adopting the problem-solving paradigm as 
their conceptual framework for analysis, those studies do not contribute to the modeling of design – 
which is a cause for concern if design research is to find and develop its own authentic models.  
 
In a paper called natural intelligence of design, Cross (1999) argues that design research should also 
contribute to artificial intelligence, and not only the other way around. The current paper adopts and 
expands on that position: Design involves possibly the richest forms of reasoning, providing thus a 
privileged context for the study of human cognition. We believe design reasoning is significantly 
different than ordinary reasoning situations since it involves the construction of previously inexistent 
objects. Rather than reducing design to other cognitive phenomena (such as problem-solving or 
incubation), design research should build richer models of design and creativity that would be useful 
for other disciplines as well. If we simply take formal models coming from AI and use them for 
describing design, we are restrained and forced to have design theories reduced to the reasoning 
paradigm underlying those approaches (i.e. decision and learning) –leaving out the possibility to study 
design creativity. By contrast, if we produce models specific to design, representing thus the 
specificity of design reasoning, we might be able to give back something in return to other disciplines.  
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1.1 Autonomous artificial systems requires conceptive intelligence 
A most important chapter in current artificial intelligence research is to build systems that are 
autonomous. In most cases, if not all, what is meant by autonomous is the ability of an agent to behave 
within set limits in the way it is defined by the system-builder without the necessity of human 
intervention. This kind of design is enforced by an omni-present engineering concern: reliability of a 
system – which requires, in turn, predictable performances. Typically, on projects like Curiosity rover 
(Goth 2012), that entails significant investments, reliability of the system primes over most of other 
possible criteria. In such contexts, a system that has the ability of surprising its builders would rarely 
be a particularly desirable feature. For this reason, most of the efforts in AI have concentrated on 
planned and predictable behavior, independently of the technique used to implement intelligent 
functions. The hindsight is that, from this seemingly natural tendency of artificial intelligence 
philosophy and objectives, it can be seen that all incentive and aspiration for systems that can surprise 
their builders in a good way was also eliminated. This insistence on the construction of plans of 
actions (whether off-line or on-line), restricting voluntarily the domain, optimizing algorithms or 
programs for a specific, pre-defined and fixed set of tasks naturally prevented AI to look for systems 
capable of building new tasks in a creative way and that exploits old experiences for dealing with that 
novelty.  
1.2 Beyond solving given tasks: Conceptive systems capable of designing original tasks 
The present paper claims that truly autonomous systems require a specific form of reasoning that we 
call conceptive intelligence. By conceptive intelligence, we mean a capacity for an agent to design 
new concepts with respect to what it has observed (outside the scope of what is learned, e.g. by 
induction, over the observed objects) and to take necessary actions to build, realize or implement that 
concept. Such systems would thus be able to formulate new tasks continuously and try to solve them. 
There are numerous engineering and theoretical challenges for building such a system. These issues 
has been discussed in AI under the theme artificial life or open-ended evolution (Bedau 2003). The 
perspectives offered are based on traditional paradigms of AI, such as learning, interaction and 
randomness. In this work, we present an alternative view called imaginative constructivism, coming 
from design research (Kazakci 2013). Based on the creative reasoning process described by (Brouwer 
1907, 1908, 1948; Heyting 1975; van Dalen 1981; Niekus 2010), this view suggests that design is a 
process by which the construction of objects proceeds towards conceivable and imagined properties. 
This is a dual constructivist process where creativity can occur both at the level of top-down 
generation of new definitions and the bottom-up generation of methods for building objects. 
1.3 Brouwer machines: a model for conceptive systems 
Given the above orientation, this paper defends the thesis that classical and foundational models in AI 
and related fields, such as decision and learning models, are implicitly based on some premises that we 
call the-world-as-it-is paradigm. We discuss basic formal models of decision and learning in order to 
explicate the differences of such models compared to design (section 2). This allows us to introduce an 
alternative worldview, namely the-world-as-it-can-be, based on the notion of design as imaginative 
constructivism (section 3).  This framework allows us to discuss and analyze the traditional notion of 
search, omnipresent both in AI and design literature. We analyze a number of search processes and 
discuss their limits for describing design. In particular, we argue that combinatorial search can be seen 
as a construction process – though it has hardly ever been applied in the dual constructivist 
perspective described by the notion of imaginative constructivism. Building on those analyses, we 
sketch a model, called Brouwer machine, for a system that would incorporate a form of conceptive 
intelligence and discuss some issues related to its implementation. Last, we discuss the type of 
creativity that can be achieved by means of genetic algorithms. By interpreting this approach through 
our framework, we show that these are constructions machines rather then conceptive systems. 
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2 Revealing hidden limitations of traditional formalisms for conceptive 
reasoning: “the world as it is” as a paradigm 
Traditional formal basis of models of decision and learning are implicitly based on a paradigm that 
analyses the world as it exists. In decision paradigm, decisions are taken about objects that exists or 
that are known to be feasible. In machine learning, the aim is to learn categories in a bottom-up 
fashion for objects that exists. Consequently, those formal approaches are not adapted for the creation 
of new objects. Let us discuss the properties of those models based on the underlying formalisms. 
2.1 Decision paradigm as evaluation of known objects 
Tsoukiàs (2008) defines a generic evaluation model into which a large part of the existing decision 
aiding models and methods can be fit. His model is an n-tuple: 
M =< A,D,E,H,U,R >, where 
• A is a set of objects (alternatives, solutions) to which the model will apply; 
• D is a set of dimensions (attributes) under which the elements of A are observed, measured,  
• E is a set of measurement scales associated to each element of D; 
• H is a set of criteria under which each element of A is evaluated;  
• U is a set of uncertainty measures associated to D and/or H;  
• R is a set of operators enabling to obtain synthetic information about 
the elements of A or of A × A, namely aggregation operators (acting on preferences, measures, 
uncertainties, etc.). 
 
The distribution of the various parameters in the model irrevocably denunciates where the majority of 
the efforts have been concentrated in the decision literature. With the exception of A, all the elements 
of the model are destined to measure and compare the properties of the alternatives. Objects from A 
are described on some scale along different dimensions. Whether there are some uncertainty measures 
or not, an aggregation procedure compiles this various information, where usually some information is 
lost, but an overall evaluation is reached at. 
 
It is claimed by Tsoukiàs (2008) that this model can accommodate almost all major formal decision 
techniques and approaches. It is instructive to note that this model can only function if all the model 
parameters are supplied, or else, there can be no evaluation. Compared to decision processes, in design 
situations most of these information do not exist and cannot be collected simply by asking participants 
to the process. In particular, the set A is empty prior to the process (Hatchuel and Weil, 2002). It is 
precisely the aim of the design process to construct the objects that are called alternatives. Innovative 
design is such an important process in the current economic processes because we do not have 
alternatives to many challenging problems. Most of the writings about decision paradigm considers the 
inability to take (correct) decisions will lead to a crisis. Yet, major crises occurs when no alternatives 
exists when an action is necessary. 
 
It should be remarked that the decision paradigm does not consider the question of generating objects. 
Albeit there exist some work, mainly in engineering design literature, using the terms ‘generation of 
alternatives’ by means of evolutionary computation. In those works, what is being generated are a 
discrete and finite set of alternatives, typically on the Pareto frontier given by some set of criteria, 
from among an infinity of solutions (called, the feasible solution set) that are assumed to already exist 
and feasible. Thus, no new object is really being created and object that are unfeasible at the beginning 
of the process are not even considered. 
 
In decision and evaluation models, objects being defined at the beginning of a process and assumed to 
be feasible, the only knowledge that is being derived from the process is the preferential information 
from what is already known about the objects. On the other hand, design focus on the construction of 
new objects:  
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Another way to characterize the difference between decision and design processes is to consider the 
notion of “states of nature” omnipresent in the decision models. In decision, the main source of 
uncertainty and ambiguity is often conceptualized as an uncertainty measure (e.g. a probability 
distribution or a possibility relation) over the states of the natures. Most approaches dealing with such 
structure either try to reduce the uncertainty or to take decisions in such a way that it will optimize 
some estimated outcome (e.g. minmax regret). Note that it is never the question of changing the world 
to provoke the creation of new states of nature: it is considered that the world can be changed by 
means of the actions of an agent (thus, moving forward to some alternative state of nature) but no new 
worlds are created. Design models should go beyond this framework since what is of interest is the 
passage from one system (states and transitions) to the next – and hopefully towards a more fruitful 
one. A related question that we shall try to shed some light later on is “how does an artificial program 
provoke new states of nature?” 
 
(Bouyssou et al. 2013) argue that evaluation tools “are a consequence of the decision aiding process” 
and they should not be chosen before the problem has been formulated or the evaluation model 
constructed.  On the basis of the discussion so far, we argue that evaluation models (and tools) are a 
consequence of a design process, especially in the case where there is no feasible alternatives at the 
beginning of the process and not the other way around.  
 
A simple model that explains the evaluation process would be 
X, f → Y  
where X is the set of alternatives, Y= f(X) is the evaluation and the task is to determine D,E,H,U and 
R to build f and apply it on X. No new objects are created; at best information about already feasible 
alternatives are discovered and compiled by means of formal processes to reach additional 
information, called evaluation. Evaluation models operate indeed within a world-as-it-is paradigm, 
without changing the world by means of creation of new types of objects. 
2.2 Learning algorithms as eliciting consequences of known objects 
Machine learning approaches have also been designed to operate on known objects. Two major 
paradigms are inductive and deductive learning. In deductive learning approaches some database of 
knowledge is used to produce new knowledge under some given closure operator. For example in 
propositional logic, modus ponens allow discovering the consequences of known facts. Given a theory 
T = (P, P → Q) and an operator of deduction ⊢, we can derive T ⊢ Q. Levesque calls T explicit 
knowledge, where as Q, the logical consequence of T, is implicit knowledge (Levesque 1984). In such 
a learning mechanisms, any notion of novelty would be deceptive. When Q is revealed through 
deduction, some new facts are indeed learned but no new objects have been created. At the very best, 
in more general cases such as first-order logic deduction, new knowledge about already existing 
objects will be produced. 
 
In inductive learning approaches, the aim is to extrapolate relationships from a set of observed objects, 
called a training set, so that accurate predictions about future examples can be made. More formally: 
• (xi)i=1..n are observations (objects) where for all i, xi ∈ X ⊆ R
p
;  
• X = (xi,j)i=1..n,j=1..p, the matrix of observations;  
• Y = (yi)i=1..n, the observed output; 
In a classification problem the output corresponds to C classes; where each individual object needs to 
be assigned (e.g. good, medium, bad grades for students). In a linear regression problem, the output 
will be a continuous variable; Y ∈ Rn. 
 
Independent from the specific algorithm used or the number of the output classes, learning problems 
formulated in this fashion aim to build a function f representing as much as possible the mapping that 
exist between the observed objects and the corresponding outputs. More formally, assuming that 
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(xi,yi)i=1..n are realizations of some random variables (Xi, Yi)i=1..n from some unknown distribution over 
existing objects, the aim of the learning algorithm is to approximate a function f such that Y ̄ = f(X) 
that is close to Y given some distance metric l. The function f is called a predictor and the metric l is 
called a loss function. Much of the machine learning literature revolves around this notion of loss 
function: algorithms are optimized for specific cases of learning problems in order to handle problems 
related to loss functions, accuracy of the predictions for future observations in terms of recall and 
precision. A basic model that explains this approximative (or predictive) stance is thus; 
X,Y →f 
where X, Y and f are as defined above. With respect to design, we can see that what is created here is 
not new objects, nor new classes of objects (the outputs). It is a function that is hopefully a good 
representation of the mapping between objects and their corresponding classes. What is sought is not 
the creation of new classes of objects, to for which corresponding objects are built, but a search for a 
fit between the available and already existing objects and their known categories. Learning models are 
not designed to create new objects nor to use existing available data to hypothesize about the 
possibility of objects that may not even be contained in the available data. They do not consider what 
cannot be found in the current data but that could be interesting to know. They neglect thus the fact 
that sometimes it is simply more important to decide what to look for then finding what is already 
there. As such, although different from the evaluation models, learning algorithms also operates 
assuming implicitly that the world exists as it is and by applying a series of operations we can learn 
new knowledge from that world by generalizing upon existing objects or relationships. 
3 Design reasoning as “the world as it can be” 
3.1 Design as the evolution of object definitions 
By contrast to decision and learning paradigms, design is the creation of some new object. Design 
theories and models try to capture in various ways this basic and fundamental observation. Most 
theories of design could be described, one way or another, as the evolution of some description D of 
the designed artifact (i.e. D1 D2… Dm). For instance, in Schön and Wiggins’s description 
(Schön and Wiggins 1992) a transition from one description to another occurs with what is called a 
‘design move’. In topological spaces (Braha and Reich 2003), the descriptions are 2-uples of the form 
<Fi, Dj> where transitions may either change Fi (e.g. functional descriptions) or Dj (e.g. structural 
descriptions) thanks to operators called ‘closure’ (e.g. deductive closure). A majority of such design 
models, if not all, do not attempt to describe the creative mechanism leading such transitions. An 
exception is C-K design theory (Hatchuel and Weil, 2003). Compared to most of other formal design 
process models, C-K theory describes the evolution of design definitions by placing knowledge at the 
heart of the transitions. Said in other terms, knowledge is a necessary resource for generation new 
descriptions: Objects descriptions are created and evolve using knowledge, taken in the form of logical 
propositions with a truth value. 
3.2 Design as imaginative constructivism 
Going further (Kazakci 2013) brings some new perspectives concerning the elaboration of definitions 
in design. He argues that constructivism is a foundational issue in design research and he studies forms 
of constructivism in the elaboration of object definitions in design. Several such forms exist in design 
literature. First, we can find a social constructivist approach, for instance in (Bucciarelli 1988), where 
object definitions are constructed collectively over time. Second, we can identify an interactive 
constructivism, for instance in the work of (Schön and Wiggins 1992), where a designer interacts with 
some media to progressively construct a design. Aside from these traditional forms, Kazakci contends 
there is a third form, called imaginative constructivism. Imaginative constructivism pleads for a world 
view that, in innovative design, new types of objects are imagined while methods for building or 
implementing those objects are sought. This is a dual constructivist process, where the construction of 
the object definition interacts with the construction of the method that would allow building or 
 6 
implementing that object. On both of these processes, i.e., in the construction of the type or the 
method, it is possible – and often, it is required, to introduce novelty. 
 
Foundations for the notion of imaginative constructivism come from the study of a particular design 
domain – the mathematics. Kazakci (2013) studies Brouwer’s Intuitionism, one of the major 
constructivist approaches to mathematics that captures several fundamental properties of design 
reasoning. First, it explains mathematical activity as a reasoning process performed over time. Second, 
it puts emphasis on the constructability of objects, rather than the truth of their existence. Third, it 
acknowledges the incompleteness of knowledge and the possibility of constructing new objects. 
Fourth, the construction of unprecedented and unpredictable objects is taken into account by a notion 
of creativity of the mathematician: her free choices. From a design theory standpoint, this is a 
significant feature of Intuitionist mathematics. Allowing an act of free choice at any moment and the 
possibility to break away from any fully determined (lawlike) object allows the consideration of 
partially determined objects with novel properties. This conception recognizes the creative nature of 
the mathematical activity. There is always the possibility to continue defining an object in a way that 
distinguishes it from all the others that are known so far, creating thus a novel object (van Dalen 
2005). 
 
Figure 1. On the left, Leonardo da Vinci’s human flying machine concept. On the right, the 
Daedalus human flying machine. Da Vinci’s imagined what a human powered flying machine 
would be like centuries before a working prototype was built – the Daedalus – by a group of 
NASA researchers and MIT engineers (Eris 2006).  
3.3 The clash of imagination vs. knowledge 
Kazakci (2010) defines imagination as the ability of the mind for creating thoughts that are not being 
(or that has never been) experienced (such as a horse with wings, a flying chair, a mobile phone 
preventing heart attacks). It is suggested that this definition is fundamental to understand human 
creativity. Strikingly, it has been ignored, or at least, not directly accounted for, in models of 
creativity. On the other hand, human beings are programmed to be sense-making machines creating a 
meaning for their experience (Bartlett 1932; Clancey 1999). Throughout our education and everyday 
experiences we are often required to reject, ignore, dismiss implausible or absurd ideas (normally, 
chairs do not fly, horses do not have wings and phones do not prevent heart attacks). 
 
Based on these premises, we can see the difficulty in the creation and evaluation of fundamentally new 
ideas: our tendency to look for meaning and possibility may prevent us to push our imagination 
towards new ideas. New ideas may seem, by their very nature, strange, or meaningless preventing the 
designer to recognize any value or investigate further. Nevertheless, it is the capacity of the designer 
that allows her to look past the domain of known objects with known properties, to formulate 
interesting combinations of properties for objects yet-to-exist and start genuinely innovative design 
processes where new classes of objects can be bred. 
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3.2 The “what” and the “how” of an object definition 
Mathematics is a particular design domain where new objects with interesting properties are sought 
(Kazakci and Hatchuel, 2009; Kazakci, 2013). A fundamental issue that causes strong oppositions 
among mathematicians concerns directly design theory: the definability of objects. Constructivist 
mathematics defend the argument that an object can only be defined and be made to exist if it can be 
constructed explicitely by a method. This view on existence of objects can be called existence as 
constructability. A method is a set of ordered operations that transforms an input to an output. In this 
sense, we can use equivocally a method, an algorithm or a proof. By contrast, non-constructivist 
mathematics accepts object definitions whose existence can be proved by logical means (i.e. without a 
method or an algorithm of construction, proven solely on the basis of given axioms by means of 
logical deduction). This view on existence of objects can be called existence as truth. This distinction 
gives us the fundamental dichotomy between constructivism and non-constructivism: Either, the world 
exists and it should be studied as such. Or, the only way to guarantee the existence of the world is to 
construct the said-world (nothing that we cannot construct exists). 
 
In design, these two extreme positions are overly strong and they may easily become false depending 
on the context. In the world, there are a variety of things that already exist about which some particular 
actor might know or observe some properties without knowing how to construct or reproduce an 
object with those properties. They are nevertheless useful and we can make use of them, choose them 
over other objects or learn about their properties without knowing a method to construct them (be it 
individually or as the society). Thus, both modes of thinking are used: what the object will be and how 
the object will be built is constructed together and interdependently (Kazakci 2010).  
 
Such dynamics are reminiscent of the distinction between the formulation of a theorem and its 
demonstration by a proof. It is known in mathematics that, in some cases such as Fermat’s last 
theorem, there have been several centuries between the two processes. In design literature, it is 
possible to find cases that highlight similar dynamics. For instance, Eris (2006) describes an example 
of the human flying machine of Leonardo da Vinci that inspired centuries later Daedalus built by 
NASA engineers; Figure 1. Examples such as this one are indicative that there may be various 
processes of construction in design processes (e.g., the construction of a definition vs. construction of 
an actual object). Recent experimental data (Eris 2004 ; Edelman 2012) also supports the idea that 
designers think and act differently when thinking about what the object should be or how the object 
can be built (Kazakci 2010). The imaginative constructivist dynamics allow thus to reveal a dual 
constructivism in design processes. This issue has been under-investigated in design literature, often 
collapsing both notions into a single one. Although theories of co-evolution (e.g. problems-solutions, 
concepts-knowledge, functions-structures) exist in design literature (Maimon and Braha 1996; Braha 
and Reich 2003; Hatchuel and Weil 2009), either they do not explicit the constructive aspects or they 
do not take into account the free-choices of the designer. 
4 Collapse to mono-space search: implicit elimination of a duality in AI 
Given the world-as-it-can-be paradigm described in the previous section, we shall analyze in this 
section some particular techniques from the AI literature in order to better understand their 
relationship with design. A fundamental notion in traditional AI is search. When the cardinality of the 
set of solutions to be considered is huge or even potentially infinite, search procedures are used to find 
solutions with desirable properties. While the notion of search is omnipresent in AI and it has been 
generally accepted as being inevitable, it has been rarely discussed what the search creates. It has been 
made abstraction of what kind of objects are manipulated during search and why, and the focus 
remained rather on optimizing search performance (i.e. search time). We shall discuss two very 
common examples of search in order to discuss and distinguish two very contrasted purposes that 
usually goes unnoticed. Let us remind that search related models (i.e. problem-solving) has been 
considered for long time as an adequate model for design (see e.g. (Cross 2001) for examples and 
(Dorst 2006) for a discussion). 
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4.1 Linear programming search: search without construction  
An archetype of search problems is search for optimal solutions to mathematical linear programming 
problems. In the case of maximization, a general form for a linear program is the following: 
Max z.x,  s.t. A.x ≤ b,  x ≥ 0   
where x = (x1,...,xn) are the real-valued variables and z = (z1,...,zn) are unit profits that defines the 
(economic) objective of search. The constants A, b and 0 circumscribe an acceptable domain of 
variation for the variables. The aim of the search algorithm is to find, among all feasible objects 
respecting the constraints, a particular one that optimizes the economic function (the objective). 
 
In this formal problem, we do not have an explicit list of the individual objects. Rather, we have 
knowledge about some properties they all satisfy (the constraints that gives what is called a feasible 
region) and a means for measuring their quality (the objective). Let us remark that, given the form of 
the feasible region, a solution always exists and all the represented objects are supposed to be feasible. 
Several search algorithms that guarantee an optimal solution are known (e.g. simplex method or 
interior point algorithms). 
 
We do not know in advance what the optimal solution will be, but we know for sure what type of 
solution it will be: This is already characterized by the constraints and even more so by the dimensions 
D = (d1, . . . dn) on which all of the objects considered in the problem formulation has been defined 
once and for all, before the algorithm is applied. The ‘what’ of the objects have been determined and 
the aim of the algorithm is not to explore alternative definition types. Said in other terms, dimensions 
or constraints do not change during the search. Compared to a design process as discussed in previous 
section, neither a new definition is created, nor, an object fitting that definition is constructed. 
Let us also note that in traditional sensitivity analysis or robustness analysis those dimensions D do not 
change either. Hence, any variability in search parameters do not provoke a new type, only a different 
optimal solution. Aside from the stability of object definitions, another major point of interest for us is 
that the optimal solution is guaranteed to be from among the feasible solutions. The purpose of the 
search is not to seek for solutions that may be unfeasible for the moment but interesting nonetheless. 
At least, in this context, search is not aiming at finding imaginary (or, fictive) solutions that are yet to 
be made feasible. 
 
Figure 2. A simple blockworld diagram. The initial state is transformed to the goal state by 
means of application of actions a1 then a2. 
4.2 Combinatorial search: search with construction…of? 
Search formalisms has been extensively applied in planning tasks as well (Fikes and Nisson 1971; 
Bonet and Geffner 2001). To get a better understanding of what kind of objects are elaborated during 
AI planning, we shall consider one of the most conventional examples used in the development of 
planning programs, namely, the block worlds (see Figure 2) (Nagata et al. 1973; Russell and Norvig 
1995). Blockworld is an abstract, closed world for experimenting with AI systems. This 
conceptualization was particularly useful for building early systems for planning and robotic 
navigation. It consists of a flat surface, a set of blocks and a robot (or a robotic arm) able to move the 
blocks around by applying some actions (e.g. pickup() or stack()). States are descriptions of the world 
by means of predicates (e.g. on(A, B) or onTable(A)). 
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Starting with an initial configuration (or, state), the program has to search a combination of actions to 
reach a final, desired configuration, called goal state. Often, there is no trivial solution for 
combinatorial search and the program might get stuck (e.g. in the above example, if B is put on top of 
the table before A) in which case backtracking is necessary. The search starts over from a previously 
explored configuration that is evaluated to be likely to lead to a solution. The program stops if the 
available computational resources are exceeded or a sequence of actions leading to the goal state has 
been found. 
 
Figure 3. The transformation of some input material by a CNC machine via a set of planned 
actions. 
This model has been used extensively as a valid model for studying human reasoning skills in 
cognitive psychology and in design research (Cross, 2001). In a design context, the goal state has been 
interpreted as the design to be reached at, i.e. a set of requirements. A designer needs to take some 
actions to manipulate objects (or, their representations, i.e. sketches) about her to reach the goal state. 
This view of design raises a set of legitimate questions (see e.g. (Dorst 2006). In our context, the main 
question is what kind of object definitions are being created and manipulated during reasoning? 
 
There are two things that are created by this process. First, a plan of actions – with a clearly defined 
input and output set – is created. In terms of the discussion of previous section, this corresponds to a 
method of construction (or, to a proof, for that matter (Kautz and Selman 1998)). The search creates a 
set of instructions (as an algorithm) that transforms some input to some output. In design and 
manufacturing related fields, a standard application of this type of search is the use of early CNC 
machines; see figure 3. Second, the output configuration that corresponds to the goal state will be 
created by the execution of the plan. In the example of figure 3, this is a sculpture of a female body. In 
the most general case, this would be a re-arrangement of the initial input objects.  
 
Where is design? The answers to this question were ambiguous in the literature precisely because the 
interpretative model used to define what design is the same as the model that is being interpreted! Our 
overview of the model of combinatorial search based on our imaginative constructivism framework 
sheds light on what is really being designed (and to what extent). The entity that appears and that 
allows the creation of the same artifact as many times as it is applied is a method of production. The 
‘sculpture’ in this example is not the design; it is the first of the many output objects that can now be 
produced. The design is the method. Thus, when combinatorial search is applied to a set of actions, 
what is being designed is a constructive proof of existence producing a first example of the new type 
of object (assuming the system has not produced a plan for the same goal state before).  
Hence, the interesting question for us is: where does the type (definition) come from? Is it new? The 
answer to this question is now straightforward: the design of the ‘type’ of new object to be constructed 
has finished before the combinatorial search process has started. It was the goal state given to the 
program as a parameter. Whether it was new or not cannot be determined based solely on the input-
output pair of the search process. We need to be able to define a reference library of types that is 
specific to each designer that contains the old objects and their types in order to be able to determine if 
a particular type of sculpture is new. Therefore, there is no creative design of types, nor creative 
design of a method (only, known actions are combined) – only a novel sequencing of actions in order 
to create a new method for constructing an object with a stable definition (of what that object is). 
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Figure 4. Different definitions of ‘human body’ – the creation of such ‘types’ are not taken into 
account by standard combinatorial search over action sequences  
Unless the search process can change the type definition of objects on the run, there is no possibility to 
imagine new types of objects (in this setting, new goal states). In the previous example of body 
sculptures, new goal states are simply new representations of the human body; Figure 4. In traditional 
combinatorial search this aspect does not exist, since the combination is only applied to individual 
actions to build methods. As we have seen in section 3, the imaginative constructivist nature of design 
presupposes that the creative design act requires the combinative creation of both type descriptions 
and methods. In AI programs one or the other of these two dimensions are not treated. Search is 
applied only on one dimension of the object definition, collapsing thus the creative dynamics we 
described previously to a mono-space search. This in unfortunate insofar as the real richness of a 
design reasoning occurs at the interaction of these two types of definition construction processes 
(Kazakci 2013) 
 
Another shortcoming of this type of search process, in terms of its adequacy for incorporating 
conceptive intelligence, is its inability to creating goals – that might even be not achievable by the 
current set of actions. This assumes not the ability to formulate goal states, but also goal states that 
cannot be reached at by the current set of actions. In such a case new actions need to be learned. 
Systems able to learn new types of actions, thus enabling the realization of new types of tasks, exist in 
AI and robotics literature (see e.g. (Konidaris et al. 2010)). However, a dual constructive search 
mechanism, allowing the system to build new and unprecedented tasks, while acquiring new types of 
actions by means of interaction with the environment do not exist. This, however, is the sine aqua non 
of a conceptive intelligence for autonomous creativity.  
5 Brouwer machine: a conceptual model for systems with conceptive intelligence 
According to the imaginative constructivism framework, design implies a dual constructivism on the 
definition of types of objects and the methods by which they are produced. This type of process 
involves the articulation of top-down and bottom-up processes. Both the construction of definitions 
and the construction of methods may be changed significantly during the activity by the free choices 
of the designer. Bases on these premises, the first feature of the model we introduce is a language with 
two components. 
5.1 Dimensions of definition 
The overall idea behind our notion of Brouwer machine is that there are two fundamental dimensions 
through which a class of objects might be specified: 
• The type definition – Part of the definition of an object stating what the object is through the 
specification of its properties 
• The method definition – Part of the definition of an object stating how the object can be built 
through the specification of a sequence of actions 
 11 
Let us have a set of properties PT = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) accessible to the system at time T. Let LP
T = (c1, c2, 
. . . , cN ) be the library of conceptual descriptions at time T. Each ci is a non-empty subset from P
T; i.e. 
∀i,ci ∈[(ΠP
T)\Ø] where ΠX stands for partitions of set X. 
Let us have a set of actions AT = (a1, a2, . . . , am) available to the system (i.e. through its effectors) at 
time T. Let LA
T = (π1,π2,...,πM) be the library of procedural descriptions at time T. Each πk is a non-
empty subset from AT; i.e. ∀k,πk ∈[( ΠAT)\Ø]. Note that LP allows defining goal states whereas LA 
allows defining plans of action for reaching those goal states. 
5.2 Free choices by novelty-driven search on definitions 
The aim of the system is to mimic a kind of design reasoning by continually alternating between: 
• the generation new type descriptions cnew such that cnew ∈[(ΠP
T
)\Ø] and cnew ∉ LP
T
 
• the generation of new plans of actions πnew such that πnew ∈ [(ΠA
T
)\Ø] and πnew ∉ LA
T
 and 
allowing the construction of cnew 
There are several points to be considered.  First, the system needs a mechanism to find new cnew and 
πnew. One way of generating these entities is to novelty driven search (NDS). This might for instance 
be a genetic algorithm pushing for novelty rather than fitness with respect to predetermined criteria 
(Lehman and Stanley 2008). In each iteration, privileged solutions are only those that are newest (i.e. 
farther apart) from the existing set of solutions. Taking advantage of the crossover and mutation 
operators genetic algorithms are indeed able to build a myriad of combinations of existing entities, 
some of which will not exist in the current libraries. Other solutions are envisageable but will not be 
discussed in the current work. 
 
Second, for any cnew generated, it is likely that the system will not have an existing πk able to build cnew. 
Thus, the imagination of a new enunciation will trigger the necessity to imagine new plans of actions. 
Let us also note there is an injective mapping from PT and AT, in the sense that for each ci there may be 
multiple plans πk building it. The inverse is not true. 
 
Third, the system will not be able to generate new plans and concepts indefinitely. The combinatorial 
search among LP and LA will eventually exhaust all possible new combinations – at which point, no 
further imagination is possible for the system (with respect to the definition of section 3). To prevent 
this and in order to progress towards truly autonomous agents, the system needs another operator that 
allows it to communicate with its environment and to be able to add new elements to P or to A to 
enrich its design languages. 
5.3 Example and discussion: Mazes and escape artists 
An example Brouwer machine might be set up in a hypothetical domain consisting in the design of 
mazes. Mazes are typical examples for traditional search programs in AI. In our case, rather than 
having a solver for a particular maze, a Brouwer machine would be an escape artist, not only solving 
mazes but aspiring to create new ones in a continuous manner – such that every new maze would be 
more interesting to solve in some sense (i.e. more challenging), with respect to the currently known 
mazes. In such an application, the system would generate mazes, always targeting newer mazes that 
are different. For each maze, it would search a plan of escape (e.g. evolving plans of actions until a 
plan that solves the maze is found). At first sight, this might seem as a standard co-evolutionary 
process. There are several significant differences. First, we are interested in finding a repertoire of 
mazes and escape plans, rather than individuals overcoming each other by mutual co-evolution. It is 
not the maze versus the escape artist that is being evolved. It is a designing entity, the Brouwer 
machine, which explores the creation of new mazes and plans for solving them quickly. Contrary to 
typical co-evolution logic, a newly generated maze will not be a maze that the plan from the previous 
iteration would not be able to solve (hence, not necessarily a better maze, according to some criteria). 
Instead, it would simply be a newer one – with respect to the previously explored mazes. Each plan 
will solve only one maze: it will be a method for that instance only. 
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Even with this simple example, some limits for implementation already appear. First, the maze domain 
is too limited in the vocabulary it allows for LP and LA. For instance, whatever the new maze the 
system imagine, it suffices to use the same set of navigation actions to solve it. In this example 
domain, there will be no opportunity to extend LP and LA eventually. In contrast, if we consider a 
Brouwer machine set up on a digital image or physical prototyping domain, the scope is considerably 
broadened since the possibilities are endless. 
 
Second, the iterative alternation between the maze definitions and solver definitions are rather 
simplistic. More interesting would be some mechanism by which an interaction with previous mazes 
and their solvers can be achieved to foster the dual construction process. There are at least two types 
of interactions we can consider: 
• How old solutions can help a particular maze? 
• How old solutions and mazes can help produce new mazes (e.g. different and showing 
particularly interesting behaviour, such as increased level of difficulty without any explicit 
objectives). 
In realistic design situations, those interactions immediately become complex. They are not taken into 
account by the current framework, but they constitute a necessary step to progress towards conceptive 
intelligence.  
5.4 Central problem of conceptive intelligence 
The previous remarks allow us to finally state and discuss what we deem as the central problem of 
conceptive intelligence. In what we called an imaginative constructivist process, a dual constructivism 
with free choices can occur on both properties and methods defining objects. The central ability for a 
Brouwer machine, or any designer thereof, is the ability to choose which novelty will be pursued and 
elaborated. As mentioned, in a realistic design setting, an expert designer would generate more than 
one novel object definitions that might be explored next. The true mark of an expert is to better judge 
which of the currently considered novelties is worth exploring given the available resources. Said in 
other terms, it would be a decision mechanism not for choosing a best among existing objects, but a 
most interesting to explore among a set of novel definitions. Work initiated in (Hendriks and Kazakci 
2011) offers some perspectives on the logic of this issue. As signalled in (Kazakci 2013), this is a 
decision theory specific to design processes – that is yet to be formulated.  
6 Discussion: Are genetic algorithms creative? 
6.1 Genetic algorithms as a mean for scientific discovery  
Genetic algorithms offer a powerful approach for combinatorial search. Based on the metaphor of 
natural evolution, a genetic algorithm maintains a population of candidate solutions for the problem at 
hand, and makes this population evolve by iteratively applying a set of stochastic operators. At each 
iteration, a subset of the population survives and is given the opportunity produce offsprings. The 
survival of candidate objects depends on some evaluation criteria, called fitness. Genetic algorithms 
have been often associated with creative processes (Koza 1999; Koza et al. 1999; Renner and Ekárt 
2003) since, given a problem formulation, the solution space can be explored conveniently by 
evolving candidate solutions in various directions. 
 
A recent application of genetic algorithms that offers promising perspectives is in the field of 
discovery of scientific laws from experimental data. (Schmidt and Lipson 2009) have been able to 
distil free-form natural laws from motion-tracking data captured from various dynamic physical 
systems ranging from double pendulum to harmonic oscillators using genetic algorithms. Starting with 
symbolic expressions (e.g. +, /, sin(), ω, θ, etc.), the algorithm was able to generate more and more 
complex sentences by combination. The representation of a symbolic equation in computer memory is 
a list of successive mathematical operations. The construction of such symbolic expressions that fits a 
given dataset is a traditional application in the field of data-mining called symbolic regression.  
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Figure 5. On the left, the picture of Mona Lisa as a ‘type’ representation; On the right, ‘an 
instance’ approximating the type using a combination of polygons – pictures produced using 
Watchmaker framework 
The particular insight Schmidt and Lipson propose is a principle for identifying non-triviality. This 
insight is based on the observation that, in order to claim a fit, between the generated symbolic 
expression and the data observed, the partial derivatives of both the symbolic expression and from the 
numerical data should vary in the same way. Using this principle as the fitness measure and the 
genetic algorithm over symbolic expressions they were able to generate complex invariants such as 
Hamiltonians, Langrangians and equations of motion for system of various complexity. The type of 
law discovered depends on the type of variables provided to the system on a given run. Symbolic 
expressions obtained from simpler systems have been found to be effective in bootstrapping search for 
more complex systems. 
Without prior knowledge about physics, kinematics, or geometry, (Schmidt and Lipson 2009)’s 
system detected complex relationships such as nonlinear energy conservation laws, Newtonian force 
laws, geometric invariants, and system manifolds in various synthetic and physically implemented 
systems. And it is claimed that many applications exist for this approach, in fields ranging from 
systems biology to cosmology, where theoretical gaps exist despite abundance in data and that 
scientists may use tools such as theirs to focus on interesting phenomena more rapidly and to interpret 
their meaning. 
6.1.1 The intelligence of genetic algorithms – conceptive or not? 
Schmidt and Lipson’s system is a powerful discovery engine. Since discovery is a notion that we can 
relate to intelligence, the question that is interesting for us: is it intelligent? Is it creative – Considering 
the fact that it discovers complicated laws of nature without any notions of physics or domain 
knowledge? There is indeed a tendency to assume that genetic algorithms are, in a sense, intelligent. 
For instance, (Reynès 2007) considers that genetic algorithms incorporate intelligence at the level of 
selection of survivors – and that, this is the only intelligent step. Said in other terms, it is claimed that 
the intelligence of the genetic algorithms is in the selection mechanism. Jacques Monod, Nobel 
Laureate in Biology defends this very view: « Many distinguished minds appear not to be able to 
accept, nor to comprehend that, from a source of noise, the selection was able to, by itself alone, pull 
all the music in the biosphere. »  
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The selection step in a genetic algorithm is based on a metric representing the membership (or the 
distance from) a type definition; Figure 5. As we have stressed previously, creating a type and building 
an instance of that type are two separate things. As can be seen from the Mona Lisa example in Figure 
5, the only thing selections does is to evaluate how far away an instance is from the type defining its 
category. What does the genetic algorithm in this context is simply to construct an instance of a type – 
given the type. If any intelligent act occurred in this context, it is not during the selection, but during 
the type creation – by Da Vinci himself, in this example. Contrary to what Monod claims, it’s not the 
selection that pulls the music from a continuum of noise - It is a design effort that determined, before 
even the process of construction has started, what is a nice noise. 
6.1.2 Interpreting Schmidt and Lipson’s system through Brouwer machines 
Now that we have qualified genetic algorithms as a construction machine (just like the combinatorial 
search process discussed in section 4.2), we can discuss Schmidt and Lipson’s system with respect to 
the notion of Brouwer machine. A point that matches immediately is the symbolic expressions of 
equations. Those can be easily mistaken as types. Howeber, when we consider that they are stored in 
memory as a list of successive operations, it is easier to see that this list of operations can be seen as 
plans of actions, which, when applied, reproduces an instance similar to what has been observed. AT 
are all the elementary operations and constants (e.g. ω, θ, sin(), +, etc). LA
T is then all the sentences 
that have been formulated by combination at iteration T (e.g. sin2(x1) + cos
2(x1) or x1 + 4.56 – x2x1/x2). 
Note that the instances (streams of a motion data captured by a camera) are not perfectly generalized 
by the system. Thus, the application of a plan discovered along the way will not produce the signal 
that was observed either. Note also that the methods formulated by the system are not created per se. 
They are generalization over observations using a convenient construction machine. This also implies 
that the system will not have any free-choice on the methods created – since it does not target any act 
of creativity or even intelligence: it only aims reproducing accurately what has been observed.  
 
Concerning the set PT we can see that there is no properties, or any combination thereof, that are 
considered by the system. Consequently, there is neither type creation, nor any attempt to create new 
types by free-choices. That would have been a whole different story, had the system the ability to 
think of new types of natural laws – and then take action and provoke a change in the world to test its 
set of methods. This takes us back to the central question of conceptive intelligence: how would the 
system know what novel type to create and to try to build? We see that Schmidt and Lipson’s system, 
despite its power and accuracy for the task domain with respect to which it was built, is not a system 
with which we can hope to create an autonomous explorer that would conceive any new scientific 
concept. In its current form, rather than distilling laws, Schmidt and Lipson’s system distil only 
regularities within the observed data – that would be recognized as theoretical concepts in physics by 
an expert on the matter, already familiar with that concept. Without such knowledge and the ability to 
formulate preferences on unknown types obtained by free-choices, it is not possible to have systems 
with conceptive intelligence. 
7 Conclusion 
The current paper offered a perspective on what we termed conceptive intelligence – the capacity of an 
agent to continuously think of new object definitions (tasks, problems, physical systems, etc.) and to 
look for methods to realize them. This framework we call Brouwer machine is inspired by research in 
the design theory and modelling, with its roots in the constructivist mathematics of Intuitionism. The 
dual constructivist perspective we described offers the possibility to create novelty both on the types 
of objects and methods for constructing objects. More generally, the theoretical work on which 
Brouwer machines are based is called imaginative constructivism. Based on the framework and the 
theory, we discussed a number of paradigms and techniques omnipresent in AI research – and their 
merits and shortcomings for modelling aspects of design, as described by imaginative constructivism. 
To demonstrate and explain the kind of creative process expressed by the notion of Brouwer machine 
we contrasted it with a system using genetic algorithms for scientific law discovery.  
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